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The numbers that provide a context for this issue on refugee status determination (RSD), though stark and well-known, bear repeating. In excess of two hundred 
million people live outside of their country of nationality.1 
Sixty-seven million people have been forcibly displaced from 
their homes.2 Twelve million individuals have no country of 
nationality.3 Of these overlapping populations, only about 
eleven million4 fall under the defi nition of “refugee” within 
the meaning of the term set out in the mandate of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees5 and as defi ned in 
the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951.6 In 
these statistics lie the challenges of refugee status determina-
tion (RSD): determining who is a “refugee” and, conversely, 
who is not. As to how this task should be accomplished, nei-
ther the treaty nor the statute is of much direct assistance: 
there are 46 articles in the Refugee Convention and 22 para-
graphs in the Statute of UNHCR, none of which address the 
issue of RSD.
And yet every year, over half a million individuals ap-
proach state or UNHCR offi  cials and seek a determination 
that they are refugees. In Canada alone, over 25,000 indi-
viduals seek recognition of their status as refugees every 
year.7 Decisions are made by states and UNHCR in a similar 
number of claims and there is a slowly shrinking backlog of 
750,000 individuals who continue to await a determination 
of their status. Decisions are issued by a variety of offi  cials 
and institutions: administrative offi  cers of a state, quasi-ju-
dicial tribunals, courts, members of the political executive of 
states, and by agencies of the United Nations.8
Amongst policy makers the problematic of RSD—of sort-
ing out the eleven million refugees from a larger group of 
migrants and displaced persons—has become known as “the 
asylum-migration nexus”9 or, more recently and more pro-
saically, the problem of “refugee protection and durable solu-
tions in the context of international migration.”10 Th e articles 
in this issue of Refuge directly and indirectly engage with this 
problematic but collectively see the problem less as ensur-
ing migrants do not access refugee protection and more as 
ensuring that refugee protection is in fact off ered and legal 
protections guaranteed to refugees.
As Care points out in his article in this issue, RSD has 
been with us in one form or another for more than a century. 
However, it has only been within the past few decades that 
RSD processes became widely entrenched in most Northern 
countries. As a guide to the more recent development of 
RSD, it is now almost three decades since the UNHCR’s sem-
inal global survey of RSD processes and the publication of 
its handbook on how RSD decisions should be made. Before 
these publications, there was almost nothing by way of com-
mon standards and guidelines that extended beyond the pa-
rochial study of the system presently in place in any given 
country.
In the 30 years since these publications, a vast scholarship 
has emerged on the criteria that should be applied by deci-
sion-makers in RSD or, in short, the defi nition of a refugee. 
Th e cornerstones of the refugee law scholarship addressed in 
this issue were laid by Grahl-Madsen11, Goodwin-Gill12 and 
Hathaway.13 Th eir work has enduring worth but precious 
little to say about RSD. Perhaps the neglect of RSD is simply 
a refl ection of a relative inattention in the scholarship and in 
practice to the processes of law as opposed to its substance. 
Nonetheless, the debate over RSD has increased in recent 
years. European states and civil society turned their attention 
to the issue in the draft ing of the European Union’s minimum 
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standards on RSD.14 NGOs from the Global South have cam-
paigned for UNHCR to reform its RSD.15 Th roughout the 
late 1990’s numerous countries, including Canada, the United 
Kingdom, and Australia, immersed themselves in debates 
over the reform of their RSD processes. In this context, it is 
no surprise that RSD scholarship has raised its profi le in the 
academic community and with those in charge of developing 
public policy. More recently, new groups in civil society have 
entered the discussion of RSD16 and conferences have been 
organized on the topic which, in turn, has generated a large 
body of literature on the subject. . Notably, the conference or-
ganized by Susan Kneebone and France Houle in Prato, Italy 
on “Best Practices in Refugee Status Determinations” in 2008 
resulted in some of the articles in this issue.17
Th is new scholarship builds upon an existing and vibrant 
literature: Barsky’s early work on the discourses at place in 
refugee status determination proceedings,18 Crépeau and 
Nakache’s examination of the critical spaces in the Canadian 
RSD19 and Houle’s analysis of the use of diff erent types of 
evidence by the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board 
(IRB)20 are only a few examples. Th ere are numerous com-
parative studies of the RSD process21 and research on both 
the micro and macro variables at play in status determina-
tion.22 Th is issue adds to this literature with both general and 
specifi c articles on the RSD theme. Authors seek to advance 
the literature in important ways. It contributes to the body 
of knowledge by further developing the study of legal frame-
works pertaining to RSD processes. It advances our under-
standing on practices and norms establishing RSD processes 
and decision making processes. It also expands the study of 
RSD to include the RSD processes of the Global South, in-
cluding UNHCR RSD. Finally, it actively engages with the 
literature outside of refugee law—both in the broader fi eld of 
law as well as other fi elds of study and practice.
Legal Framework
As noted previously, the Refugee Convention (and subsequent 
refugee treaties23) does not specify the process by which RSD 
should be accomplished.24 In the words of the UNHCR’s 
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria “the Convention does 
not indicate what type of procedures are to be adopted for the 
determination of refugee status.”25 Nor does it in fact require 
individualized RSD; a state may choose to give all asylum seek-
ers prima facie refugee status as is frequently done in the case 
of mass infl ux situations. Indeed, there is a diversity of state 
practice with respect to RSD which must be acknowledged. 
New models of RSD are continually emerging, including the 
Brazilian model which involves civil society described by 
Jubilut and Menicucci in this Issue. Existing models continue 
to evolve as any practitioner of refugee law will confi rm.
While silent on the precise process to be followed, Article 
9 of the Refugee Convention authorizes the use of provisional 
measures (such as detention) against a refugee only “pending 
a determination by the Contracting State” of refugee status. 
Similarly, Articles 32 and 33 specify formal legal processes 
that must occur before, respectively, expulsion and refoule-
ment are permitted. Th e former article goes so far as to nor-
mally require the right to present evidence and the right to 
representation.26
Th e silence of the Refugee Convention as to process has 
been fi lled to a large extent by other international treaties 
and domestic procedural standards. Articles 13 and 14 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provide 
procedural guarantees in various proceedings.27 Articles 19 
and 22 of the more recent International Convention on the 
Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of their Families 
provide procedural guarantees.28 Regional conventions, 
including the Banjul Charter,29 the American Convention 
on Human Rights30, the European Convention on Human 
Rights31, also provide procedural guarantees. Although there 
is some debate as to the extent to which each of these provi-
sions apply to RSD per se, collectively they provide guidance 
in establishing minimum standards for RSD. Heckman and 
Jones’s articles further elaborate on the applicability of the 
procedural protections granted in international treaties to 
procedural rights in RSD.
Furthermore, if there is a single lesson to be drawn from 
the domestic refugee law jurisprudence which has prolifer-
ated over the past two decades it is that domestic law is not 
silent about the rights to be accorded refugee claimants dur-
ing RSD. In many countries, particularly in the Global North, 
domestic constitutional provisions, statutory protections and 
the bedrock notion of the rule of law have all guided the ju-
dicial understanding of the minimum standards for RSD. 
Where the Refugee Convention is silent and international 
human rights law contested, domestic courts have provid-
ed guidance. Here in Canada, RSD as it exists in its present 
form bears the markers of past judicial decisions: Singh32; 
Deghani33; Say34; Th amotharem;35Benitez36; and Canadian 
Council for Refugees et al.37 to name but a few.
Less noticed however, has been the absence of equiva-
lent guidance by the judiciary in the countries of the Global 
South. In many countries, appeals concerning the procedures 
by which refugees are protected are heard in courts sorely 
unprepared and ill-equipped to adjudicate the debate.38 Th e 
courts in these countries have been poorly served by their 
legislative counterparts; most countries in the Global South 
do not have specifi c legislation dealing with the manner in 
which claims for refugee protection are to be determined.39 
Th e gaps extend to the legal profession. Th e well-developed 
refugee bar of the Global North is absent in most countries 
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of the Global South. As noted by Harrell-Bond in this Issue, 
it is rare to fi nd training on refugee law in even the leading 
legal institutions of countries home to large populations of 
refugees.
In many of these countries in which domestic law is si-
lent about RSD, the gap is fi lled by UNHCR. UNHCR is now 
the largest single determiner of status in the world, render-
ing individual RSD decisions to 51,000 refugee claimants 
per year in over 52 countries.40 Countries in which UNHCR 
performs RSD most frequently automatically accept the de-
cisions of UNHCR with respect to refugee status. Th e prob-
lem this presents is that UNHCR RSD frequently fails to 
provide the minimum procedural guarantees mandated by 
international law.41 Furthermore, as an international organ-
ization, UNHCR is exempt from abiding by domestic con-
stitutional and statutory procedural protections. Th e tragic 
irony of UNHCR RSD is that its operational determination 
of status oft en fails to meet the standards recommended in its 
advocacy to states.42
RSD Processes
Even in states with legislated RSD processes and close judi-
cial supervision of RSD, recent years have seen a troubling 
narrowing of access to the RSD process. Safe third country 
rules in Europe43 and North America44 have restricted the 
ability of an “onward traveler” to even enter the RSD process; 
in addition Australia, the UK and elsewhere such rules are 
also used no less insidiously to curtail the ability of refugees 
to gain protection once within RSD processes.45 Foster’s an-
alysis of these provisions in her article in this isue is bleak: 
“safe third country schemes are unworkable and undermine 
refugee protection.” Limitation periods also prevent refugee 
claimants from undergoing RSD if they have delayed beyond 
a certain period of time. In some countries, the limitation per-
iods arbitrarily limit those who can seek asylum.46 In other 
countries, UNHCR deliberately limits the number of refu-
gee claimants who are allowed to register in order to assuage 
concerns of the host country and control the intra-regional 
movements of forced migrants.47 In too many countries the 
threat of detention act as a deterrent to seeking asylum.48
Any complete study of RSD must analyse not only the pro-
cesses by which status is determined but also the rules, pro-
cesses and practices which exclude individuals and groups 
from status determination. Foster, along with Durieux, Jones, 
and Vigneswaran in this issue, take up this point. Durieux 
discusses the situation of individuals who never receive in-
dividual status determination but rather benefi t from group 
determinations. Jones analyses how the Canadian procedure 
on the abandonment of refugee claims signifi cantly reduces 
the chances of adequate protection for refugee claimants. 
Vigneswaran’s analysis suggests that our assessment of the 
exclusionary rules of an RSD process must include an assess-
ment of how individuals and institutions actually behave to-
wards refugee claimants rather than simply the text of the law. 
Vigneswaran paints a particularly troubling portrait of access 
to RSD in South Africa, which at its inception was oft en cited 
as a successful model for RSD in the Global South.
Notwithstanding earlier antecedents, RSD as it is prac-
ticed today is a relatively recent development. Th e decisions 
that are produced in RSD processes have been described as 
engaging in a “transnational” legal discussion.49 A similar 
description can be applied to the development of RSD: it has 
occurred as a result of and is the product of a transnational 
examination of the practice of RSD. At times this has oc-
curred as a result of regional deliberations, but more oft en 
the developments in RSD can be better explained as stopgap 
measures designed to respond to specifi c parochial requests 
for reform, whether from the judiciary or the public.
A consensus has emerged concerning the constituent ele-
ments and requirements of RSD. It should occur aft er an in-
person interview or hearing with a decision maker sensitive 
to the situation of the refugee claimant. Th e process should 
allow for, but not require nor necessarily automatically pro-
vide, legal representation; interpretation should be provided 
as required. A decision should be taken only aft er the refugee 
claimant has had an opportunity to present supportive evi-
dence and aft er the decision maker has undertaken an in-
quiry into the existence of such evidence. Th ere should be an 
opportunity for an independent review of the decision and, 
in normal circumstances, the removal of the refugee claim-
ant should be suspended pending the outcome of such a re-
view. Th ese elements are not controversial and are found in 
the vast majority of RSD processes in both the Global North 
and Global South. UNHCR’s own practice in RSD is consist-
ent with this consensus. All of the authors herein take issue 
in their analysis with the adequacy of the RSD processes 
under study as compared against this consensus and against 
the prevailing binding norms.
At the core of the debate is the extent to which each of 
these foregoing elements of consensus is required as a mat-
ter of law and how each of them should be interpreted. As 
Schreier notes in her article, South Africas’s use of the OAU 
Convention in its decision-making shows variation during 
the RSD process in interpretation of the law by diff erent de-
cision-making bodies. Th ese variations raise the problem of 
the competence and abilities of decision-makers, but also the 
degree of their independence in relation to government of 
the day, whether recognized by law or not. Heckman takes 
up this question in his article by examining to which extent 
international and domestic law requires refugee decisions 
(including appeals) to be made by “independent” decision 
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makers. To this end, he pays particular attention to existing 
international safeguards on independence.
Th e issue of independence is central when the time comes 
to design a RSD process. As can be witnessed, decision mak-
ers in state RSD processes range from specially trained im-
migration offi  cers to quasi-judicial offi  cers to judges. Th e 
legal situation of UNHCR imposes unique problems: who 
can provide an “independent” appellate review of fi rst-in-
stance RSD decisions? Equally, debate continues concerning 
the degree of access to appellate review—and the appropri-
ate extent of that review. Again, practice is quite parochial 
with there being no agreed upon model for appellate review. 
Although some of the processes of RSD are heterogeneous, 
this is not to suggest that comparisons cannot be made, min-
imum standards set nor minimum standards and best prac-
tices proposed.
Th e question of providing refugee claimants with legal 
assistance is of particular importance. Despite RSD oft en 
being formally “non-adversarial” and the dominance of an 
investigative model (oft en wrongly labeled inquisitorial) of 
proceedings, the increasing complexity of the defi nition of 
“refugee” and the procedures used to determine status has 
led to the necessity of claimants having access to legal assist-
ance. Absent the provision of such legal aid, refugee claim-
ants have a demonstrably lower probability of success in the 
pursuit of their claims.50 Th ese statistics are doubly troubling: 
both because of the implication that unrepresented genuine 
refugees are being refused status and because most refugees 
are unrepresented. While NGOs in the Global South, includ-
ing members of the SRLAN, are now providing legal aid to 
some refugees, they are unable to meet the demand.51 In the 
Global North, legal aid to refugees is in crisis.52
Reinforcing their already mentioned procedural disadvan-
tages, refugees undergoing RSD for resettlement have even 
less access to legal assistance.53 Indeed, a growing number 
of countries conduct RSD for refugees applying for resettle-
ment. Th ese applications are dealt with by relatively junior 
and inadequately trained staff , are oft en disposed of with-
out an interview and are rarely subject to judicial scrutiny. 
Although there may be no enforceable international obliga-
tion to grant refugee protection to applicants overseas54, it is 
inconsistent not to provide them with some of the procedural 
protections provided to inland applicants. Most of the refu-
gee claimants applying for resettlement from overseas are in 
a situation as precarious as an applicant applying for refugee 
protection from within a country; many such applicants are 
in danger of imminent refoulement or severe human rights 
violations in their country of temporary refuge.55 Th is raises 
the equally important question as to who must pay for the 
legal representation and provision of interpretation services 
to a refugee claimant? Harrell-Bond suggests that the cost 
must be borne both by the world both collectively, includ-
ing the more affl  uent countries of the Global North who in-
directly benefi t from the Global South’s refugee burden, and 
individually through committed personal action on behalf 
of refugees.
Th ese debates are joined by national and international 
policy makers, academics, and, increasingly, the individ-
uals within the process itself. Decision makers, lawyers, in-
terpreters and refugees themselves are beginning to organ-
ize and to advocate on procedural issues. Th e International 
Association of Refugee Law Judges (IARLJ), of which Case 
is past president, recently celebrated the tenth anniversary of 
its founding. Organizations and individuals providing legal 
representation to refugee claimants during RSD are increas-
ingly members of national and international networks. Th e 
new Southern Refugee Legal Aid Network discussed by 
Harrell-Bond in her article (and with which she was involved 
in founding) is one such network and there are currently dis-
cussions underway about organizing a global refugee bar as-
sociation. Interpreters, the literal voice of the process to most 
claimants, have also spoken out about unfair procedures used 
in refugee and immigration proceedings.56 Refugees have 
themselves organized themselves locally and along commun-
al lines in mass protest over defi ciencies in RSD processes (or 
its absence)—sometimes with tragic results.57
RSD Decision Making
To put it plainly: RSD is not easy. By defi nition, it involves 
determining the status of individuals from foreign countries, 
describing events elsewhere about which little is known, 
oft en speaking foreign languages and with a range of diff er-
ent cultural beliefs and behaviors. Most refugees have suf-
fered signifi cant trauma, if not before fl ight then as a result of 
fl ight. It is a process of determination that requires perpetual 
sensitivity to the unique predicament of the refugee. Oddly 
the “uniqueness” of a refugee claimant’s predicament is oft en 
used as a cudgel rather than a salve by decision makers. As 
Cleveland points out in her article, the use of prescribed 
special procedures for “vulnerable” claimants has been ham-
pered by the view of the decision makers that the situation of 
the particular claimants was not suffi  ciently diff erent from 
the generic situation of all refugees:
Few refugee decision makers can understand refugee 
claimants.58 Metaphorically, the experiences of the former 
and the latter are vastly diff erent. But additionally, refu-
gee claimants frequently cannot speak the offi  cial language 
of their country of asylum. Interpreters and translators 
are omnipresent in RSD. And yet mistakes of language are 
made and are costly. To avoid mistakes and misunderstand-
ing as much as possible, the right to an interview or hearing 
(with interpretation) before the decision-maker has become 
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established practice in RSD. However, this right can be se-
verely limited in practice. For example, in order to exped-
ite refugee determinations, the Immigration and Refugee 
Board of Canada has resorted to a paralegal instrument—a 
guideline—to ensure that the inquiry into claims will focus 
only on the issues decision-makers have predetermined to be 
central, as Houle has discussed in her article. Th e disclosure 
of extrinsic evidence relevant to the claim or the country of 
origin that will be considered by the decision maker has also 
become common practice.59
Language and access to information are not the only bar-
riers facing a refugee claimant. Diff ering social and cultural 
mores between a refugee claimant, his or her country of 
origin and his or her country of asylum can produce ob-
stacles to inquiry and misunderstanding. With so much of 
RSD hinging on the credibility of the refugee claimant, ob-
sessive attention is oft en paid to the precise wording of his 
or her written and oral testimonies. As a result, nonsens-
ical judicial doctrines persist, such as the requirement that a 
claimant identify problems in interpretation as soon as they 
occur. A potential solution to the quagmire of micro-an-
alysis of testimony given in another language and behavior 
produced by a diff ering socio-cultural point of view is the 
greater use of country of origin information. However, the 
article written by Pettitt, Townhead and Huber is a report 
on a research project of the Research and Information Unit 
of the Immigration Advisory Service examining the use of 
country of origin information in the UK RSD cautions that 
such information is not always as objective a source of in-
formation as oft en stated in refugee decisions and that its 
use by decision makers is plagued by a signifi cant selection 
bias.
Th ere is such variation between jurisdictions and with-
in jurisdictions that RSD has been described as a “lottery.” 
Refugee claimants from Iraq provide a good example of 
the variation in outcome. Within the European Union, the 
member states of which have accepted common minimum 
standards with respect to both criteria and process for RSD, 
acceptance ranged from 63% in Germany to 0% in Greece.60 
Within jurisdictions, there was an 1820% variation in asylum 
acceptance rate between the best and the worst immigration 
judge in the same courthouse.61 In Canada, 9 in 10 refu-
gee claimants get accepted by one member of the Refugee 
Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board 
while a similar proportion of the same claimants get refused 
by another member.62 Mascini adds to this newer literature 
in this issue with his case study of the variation in and vari-
ables aff ecting RSD outcome in the Netherlands. Although 
eff orts have been made by various tribunals to standardize 
processes and outcomes, such eff orts are more oft en than not 
motivated by concerns around effi  ciency than the fairness of 
the proceedings and run the risk of arbitrarily fettering the 
discretion of decision makers.
Conclusion
RSD is a means not an end. It is the process by which states 
and UNHCR identify who are entitled to the benefi ts of refu-
gee protection and thereby facilitate the fulfi llment of their 
obligations to the benefi ciaries of the international refugee 
regime. It is a truism of refugee law that RSD does not confer 
status on a refugee but merely confi rms it.63
Th e statistics quoted at the outset of this editorial belie 
the reality of refugee protection: as Durieux points out in his 
article “[t]he majority of the world’s refugees have secured a 
legal status without resort to an individual examination of 
their claims”. Th e use of group, temporary and prima facie 
recognition64, and the application on an inter-generational 
basis of the doctrine of family unity all mean that most refu-
gees are granted or denied status without ever undergoing 
anything other than the briefest of biographical examina-
tions.
Nor could the international refugee protection regime 
function otherwise. RSD consumes signifi cant resources and 
is unsustainable on a universal basis. Although exact fi gures 
are diffi  cult to determine, it is likely that the combined cost 
of RSD performed by states and UNHCR approaches or ex-
ceeds the total cost of direct humanitarian assistance provid-
ed to refugees by UNHCR.65 Hathaway has estimated that 
the Global North alone spends $10 billion on RSD, a number 
which is a scale of magnitude larger than UNHCR’s budget 
and exceeds even total UN expenditures.66
But if RSD is the means—and oft en an expensive one—
then the end is the protection of refugees. Th e questionable 
and unspoken premise of this proposition is that those in-
dividuals who are not refugees are not protected. While by 
defi nition such individuals do not have the same need for 
protection as refugees, this is not to say that they are not in 
need.67 Th e equally questionable premise is that, once recog-
nized, refugees gain protection. In many parts of the world 
this proposition is demonstrably false.68
Th is is not to say that the project of studying and improv-
ing RSD is without merit but simply to remind us that it must 
be linked to the larger questions of the provision and appor-
tionment of asylum and ultimately how we react to the stran-
gers amongst us. Th e broader milieu of RSD is indeed the 
200 million individuals outside of their country of national-
ity. In assessing RSD we must look at not only how we treat 
refugees but also how we treat strangers in our midst.
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